There has been a lot of debate lately on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (
FISA), but other than that it is either the one thing that has stopped the most terrorist attacks ever or the way that Big Brother is listening into you (depending on whether you're a righty or a lefty, respectively).
FISA was originally passed in 1978 and has continued to evolve as our country's intelligence needs have evolved, most notably and recently being amended in
2001,
2006,
2007, and a
2008 amendment has currently passed the house and is being debated in the Senate at the moment. At its basest, it is - codified in
Title 50 of the US Code,
Chapter 36 - a method by which there is a way to provide for ways in which "Foreign Powers" or "Agents of a Foreign Power" - which can include US Citizens - can have intelligence gathered in a constitutional manner within the United States.
There are five sub-chapters to the law and they deal with (in order)
electronic surveillance,
physical searches,
pen registers and trap and trace devices (aka
wire-tapping as defined in
Title 18 of the US Code),
access to certain business records for foreign intelligence purposes, and the
biennial reporting requirement of the Attorney General.
First of all, there are two ways for there to be legal electronic surveillance: with a court order or without one. I know that many of you might be up in arms about there being situations where the Executive Branch can
legally use electronic surveillance without any oversight, but there are caveats to this, as is enumerated in
§1802: The Attorney General must certify under oath that all interactions will be between foreign powers and any information gathered is solely that owned by foreign powers. Furthermore, the Attorney General must put into place "
minimization procedures" so that there is "no substantial likelihood
that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party." The
only way for any intelligence to be gathered without a court order is if the intelligence gathering operation is targeted at foreign powers, and the only way that §1802 (a) (4) - the section on how and when the Attorney General can specify a carrier to furnish information (§1802 (a) (4) (A) ) or to maintain records for surveillance (§1802 (a) (4) (B) ).
However, if there is a large enough scope that any US Citizens might have their records peeked at, the administration must have a court order (
§1804) from any of the 11 judges (at least three of whom are within 20 miles of D.C. in case a speedy warrant is required) who are designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. If an application is requested, it is typically heard immediately and can be done at any hour of the day or night. If the application is denied, it is automatically sent to a three-judge Court of Appeals - also designated by the Chief Justice - who, if they deem the denial unwarranted, fast tracks the writ of
certiorari and sends the case to the Supreme Court for a speedy overturn (
§1803). Only that never happens, since for the nearly 23,000 applications to the court under the law from 1979-2006, only
five were denied. The proceedings are secret, known only to the judge present, the government attorney present, and the Attorney General. Even under the accountability of his semi-annual report, he needn't name all names when transmitting his report to the House and Senate Committees on Intelligence and on the Judiciary. These reports are still classified, and the only information that can be transmitted to the public as to the court proceedings are the number of requests by the AG's office and the number of denials (
§1807). The only names that the AG must give in his semi-annual report (and only to the Intelligence Committee) are the names of defendants either for whom intelligence gathered was transmitted to any State or Federal Law Enforcement entities or for whom intelligence gathered was used in a trial (
§1808).
§1809 and
§1810 deal with Criminal and Civil Liabilities of those who break the law, and the penalties are
stiff, which is probably why the telecom companies are shitting bricks at the thought of not having §1810 modified or repealed. The criminal penalties are up to five years imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine for breaking the law - either engaging in warrantless electronic surveillance or disclosing any classified intelligence gathered from legal surveillance - and even more heavily, the civil liability is a combination of actual damages - $100 per day at a minimum of $1000 - from any and all involved parties and punitive damages plus reasonable attorney's fees (read: $$$$$).
§1811 says that in times of war (the war must be declared by Congress), the president may engage in unlimited warrantless and court orderless surveillance for a maximum of
fifteen days, and that's Sub-chapter I of V.
Sub-chapter II is pretty similarly structured, except it deals with physical searches instead of electronic surveillance, and it starts with the necessity of court orders in any case that may uncover anything about a US Citizen being treated as an agent of a foreign power, though if there is no substantial likelihood at uncovering information on a US Citizen and the search is solely directed at foreign powers or their agents, the Attorney General may proceed without a court order (
§1822).
§1823 deals with applications to the court, which must be given to a
FISC judge by a Federal Officer under the approval of the Attorney General.
§1824 deals with the court's rulings and assuming the court grants the warrant (as it usually does, though any declined warrants can get fast-tracked to the Supreme Court again),
§1825 talks about how the information can be used in a court of law, and, actually, if the AG
really needs to get into a place, he can order a search and apply for a retroactive search warrant within 72 hours (but if that warrant is denied, any evidence gathered from the search is moot and inadmissible in court - §1824/§1825), and §1825 also gives guidelines of how the search needs to be disclosed and notice given, though if it is in the interests of national security, the notice may be classified. Again, the AG's sole accountability is to report the number of searches requested and granted/modified/denied, and the number of searches that were of US persons and how often the AG used the 72 hour provision (
§1826).
§1827/
§1828/
§1829 are criminal penalties/civil penalties/presidential authorization during times of war, and they are exactly the same as for sub-chapter I, which means that, instead of telecoms being scared, landlords allowing illegal searches need to be scared of liability and hope for immunity, as again, does the Justice Department.
Sub-chapter III - if you're still awake - is about wire-tapping, and wire-tapping as well as recording of said wiretaps, dumping of phone lines, and recording all that information is pursuant to court order (surprise, surprise!). Honestly, it seems like Congress got lazy with this, and basically put
everything in
§1842, which lays out how to apply for authorization and approval (the AG asks the secret court or any Magistrate the Chief Justice has deemed to have the power to hear such applications), how approval is given (the judge says yes in
ex parte fashion, if he says no, it's on fast track to be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court), how there is a 90 day time limit on the tap, how results are furnished, and how there is immunity for those who provide the actual wiretapping services.
§1843 gives the AG a 48 hour window (like the 72 hours above) to order a wiretap if the need is immediate, and then in that timeframe, the court can grant retroactive permission, though any evidence gathered under an emergency wiretap that is later deemed to be unnecessary cannot be used as evidence in any trial or investigation.
§1844 gives the president a 15 day exemption if there is a Congressionally declared war, and
§1845 talks about how only legally applied for and approved wiretaps may be used and collected as evidence in any criminal proceeding or investigation.
§1846 merely states that the AG's "accountability" is to report semi-annually the number of applications requested, and the number that were granted/modified/denied. And that's Sub-chapter III, far less involved than either I or II.
But if you thought III was lazy and uninvolved, wait for IV and V. In sub-chapter IV, there is but two sections (three if you count the repealed §1863), and
§1861 is like a super-duper version of the §1842 above, where it states that, should business records be necessary, the FBI Director or a designee who is ranked no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge needs to petition a FISC judge or a Chief Justice-empowered magistrate, and it shall be approved in an
ex parte manner (if denied, the appeal will be fast-tracked to the Supreme Court), but said records cannot be used in anything other than furthering investigations, as there are no provisions to use these in any trials.
§1862 is the provisions of the accountability in this sub-chapter, and the only thing the AG has to report again is the number of applications, and the number of those granted/modified/denied - and that's all she wrote for sub-chapter IV; I told you they were getting tired of writing laws!
But that pales in comparison to sub-chapter V, which solely deals with the semi-annual AG reports, which are composed of all the shit I wrote above (
§1871).
And that is FISA, which is a perfectly well-written law, and I don't see why the Bush Administration feels that they cannot operate within the bounds of the law, considering that there are provisions for the court to operate at all hours, and there are also provisions to grant permission
retroactively if there is an emergency - which is
broadly defined as up to the discretion of the Attorney General. I personally believe there is no reason to amend the law at all, though I still am scared of a court that said yes 22,985 times out of 22,990 from the years 1979 to 2006, and
first said no in 2002, 23 years after the start of the program, but at least there is
some oversight. The fact that they want there to be no oversight, as well as to eliminate the penalties, scares me. If there is no civil penalty for following an unlawful order, then there is no reason for companies to be scared of the consequences of their actions, nor is there any reason for them to question anything or to attempt to stand up for the public. Giving them immunity is a bad idea, unless Barack Obama is planning on criminally prosecuting the companies, which would be an interesting gambit that deserves consideration in a different post.
Overall, FISA is a complicated law that does its best to balance national security with personal liberty, and it does its best to fight terrorism and foreign subversion without denying people constitutional rights. Why do we need to change it?